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Abstract 
A brief introduction to the developmental history of personality psychology is given. Two trends, the 
clinical, holistic approach and the experimental, elemental approach, lay the foundation for issues 
that would confront the field into the present. While the accepted mandate has been the study of the 
whole person, the experimental paradigm has been hegemonic. Emphasis has been placed on 
knowledge of individual differences across variety of abstract constructs. The person and the 
situation, two central concepts, have been decreed independent, alternative, competing factors in 
accounting for individual conduct. John Dewey’s psychology, based on organicism and person-
environment mutualism, is presented as challenging basic assumptions and theories of personality 
psychology. For Dewey, personality is a product of individuals being incorporated into the socio-
cultural milieu that is their life context, and from which they cannot be disengaged. Kritische 
Psychologie is discussed as sympathetic to some of Dewey’s propositions. 
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In considering John Dewey’s criticisms of personality psychology, it should be recognized 
that personality did not become an identifiable subdiscipline until the 1930s (when Dewey 
was in his 70s). Nonetheless, Dewey, in his psychological writings, addressed themes and 
issues that would be taken up therein. Specifically, Dewey’s organicism, and the related 
stress on coordination, emphasized the person as an organized whole, inseparable from the 
environment that was the individual’s life milieu. Such coordination was not an original 
datum but a product of development and sociocultural experience. The infant enters life 
with reflexive biological connections to the world but is immediately subject to the influence 
of other persons. Development was a matter of establishing adaptive habits that function to 
orient and connect the individual to the physical and sociocultural environment and, in that 
process, form the dispositions, attitudes and abilities that constitute the concrete personality. 
Themes that arise in this, that apply to personality psychology, include a holistic versus an 
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additive model of personality, the person versus the situation, experimental abstractions 
versus the contextualized individual, the personal environment, evolutionary fitness, and 
the fallacy of neglected development. In closing, parallels are established between Dewey’s 
critique and developments in Kritische Psychologie. 
Personality Psychology: A Brief History 
Personality psychology became an identifiable sub-discipline during the 1930s with the 
appearance of the journal Character and Personality in 1932 and some major texts in the 
later decade (McAdams, 1997), including Allport’s Personality: A psychological 
interpretation (1937), the first authoritative text which set the stage for what would follow 
(McAdams, 2009). The problem of the individual or individuality had, until then, been 
treated by science as bothersome and was brushed aside by psychologists in favor mind-in-
general, thereby omitting self-consciousness and organic unity (Allport, 1937). This abstract 
representation was to be supplemented by the new movement’s emphasis on individuality. 
While the movement may have been new, it marked a coalescence of antecedent trends 
rather than an abrupt beginning. 
During the 19th century character was the category for discussions of human conduct and 
referred to community concerns with moral issues like duty (Nicholson, 2003). As the 
century was ending, concern with issues of individual distinctiveness led to character being 
displaced by personality as the preferred category. Personality, as a popular term, entered 
psychology through the discourse of clinicians studying multiple personalities. What 
became the psychology of personality in America had two roots: the (Galtonian) 
psychometric, individual differences approach, and the psychiatric study of persons as 
individual, unique, integrated wholes (Winter & Barenbaum, 1999). As Young (1928) put 
it, there were two distinct approaches to data gathering: (1) the structural, cross-sectional 
testing of traits which assessed individual standing within a group at a particular time and 
place, and (2) the historical-genetic (developmental) perspective of psychiatrists. The 
clinician was interested in the person as situated in the natural and social environment, and 
possessing a past, present, and future (Dashiell, 1939).  
Scientific approaches to personality may be said to begin with Galton’s (1884) introduction 
of the fundamental lexical hypothesis. This was the idea that important individual 
differences would be verbally encoded in language and spurred personality psychologists to 
turn to dictionaries in identifying human traits (Allport and Odbert, 1936, for instance). 
Another Galtonian influence was the severing of the connection of individual performance 
from prevailing social conditions by defining individual performance as an expression of 
innate biology (Danziger, 1990). The notion of individuality, that psychologists would draw 
upon, was a product of the societal ideal of the individual as independent, whose qualities 
were self-contained. Regularities in conduct were assumed to pertain to an individual in 
isolation rather than an individual-in-a-situation. The environment, other people, 
institutions, and so on, were conceived of as external to the skin-bounded person as an 
autonomous individual (Winter & Barenbaum, 1999). The skin-boundedness of the person 
leads to the assumption that personality is something internal to the individual. The 
commonsense conception of personality that emerged was that it is internal to the individual, 
behind the skin; the skin being the boundary between person and environment (Sanford, 
1963). With that distinction in place, questions arose as to whether consistency in behavior 
was due to inner determinants or to the force of situations, to the person or the environment. 
Personality testing contributed to this distinction. 
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Personality testing, an offshoot of the success of intelligence testing (also begun by Galton), 
emerged from a need, during the First World War, to identify emotionally unstable recruits, 
given the large numbers of shell-shock victims (Gibby & Zickar, 2008). Woodworth 
answered the military’s commission and, in 1917, introduced the Woodworth Personal Data 
Sheet to assess emotional stability; other tests of maladjustment would follow. In the 1920s, 
personality testing became part of industrial-organizational psychology. A 1921 symposium 
convened by The Journal of Educational Psychology on intelligence measurement and 
future directions concluded that tests of character, of personal qualities, were needed 
(Piekkola, 2013). While Wells (1914) had argued that the disuniting of personality 
characteristics may ease comprehension, such characteristics could not be separated 
absolutely from other characteristics. Kelley (1928), on the other hand, maintained the 
necessity of establishing trait independence and separate measurement to avoid confusion. 
A Unitary Trait Committee (1931-1935) pursued the idea that personality is a composite of 
isolated traits (Piekkola, 2013). That trend continues into the present; for instance, the 
popular Five Factor Theory posits five independent trait factors which comprise an inherited 
structure of personality (McCrae & Costa, 2003). 
While early psychometricians were engaged in elementalistic investigations, there were 
others who took a holistic stance regarding personality. Prince (1920), for instance, referred 
to personality as “the sum total of all the biological innate dispositions, impulses, 
tendencies, appetites and instincts of the individual and all of the acquired dispositions and 
tendencies” (p. 405). Roback (1928) expanded on that in emphasizing that `sum’ should be 
taken not as additive but integrative. Allport (1924) bemoaned the lack of an adequate 
representation of the total personality given the current investigations of isolated traits; traits 
were there, but personality was missing. McDougal (1932), in the first article of the 
inaugural issue of Character and Personality, wrote that “. . . each personality is in its 
degree an integrated unity of all its factors . . . each distinguishable part of which owes 
something of its nature to its place in the whole and to its active relations with all other 
parts” (p. 16). 
A small number of psychologists, thus, were writing of the need to develop a view of 
persons as integrated wholes operating in the world (Woodworth, 1951). The outlook was 
holistic with the aim of studying the whole person, which contrasted with the prevailing 
elementalism in American psychology (McAdams, 1997). Even Terman (1934), of 
intelligence testing fame, contended that an accurate representation of personality could not 
be cobbled together from numerous test scores; it is an organismic whole, not additive. 
Personality traits are more than intercorrelated; they are functionally interactive in ways that 
are infinitely complex. From such thinking arose the mandate for personality psychology to 
explain persons as integrated wholes functioning in their daily lives (Funder, 2013). While 
that may be the mandate, it is the individual differences approach, focused on isolated 
characteristics, that has dominated the field. To Allport (1937) this method, which he called 
differential psychology, fails to deal with individuality. It selects a single quality or attribute 
for study, rather than the individual from whom the attribute is abstracted, and places it 
within a range for a population. As Allport wrote, “the patterning of the individual functions 
in the individual case is never directly considered” (1937, p. 10, emphasis in original). 
Among those seeking evidence of individual traits, a consensus arose that evidence of traits 
would require cross-situational consistency and temporal stability. Early on that assumption 
faced challenges. Watson (1930), the arch behaviorist, reduced personality to the sum of 
objectively observed activities/habit-systems which are dominated by the situation. 
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Likewise, Kantor (1938) considered personality a series of latent responses evoked by an 
appropriate stimulus—a reaction system. Symonds (1924) questioned whether traits were 
universal qualities of the individual, operating in independence from situations, given the 
alterations in people’s reactions to changing situations. Subsequently, Hartshorne and May 
(1928) provided empirical evidence for a lack of consistency in the trait of honesty. 
Newcomb (1929), too, found no compelling evidence of similar responses to varying 
situations. The issue of consistency versus specificity had thus taken root before the formal 
subdiscipline arose, and, with it, a supposition of person-environment separation. During 
the 1940s and 50s centralist theories focusing on internal determinants were dominant in 
the field, but this ̀ person’ view would be challenged by a situationist critique (Pervin, 2002). 
During the 1960s-80s it was manifest in the `person-situation debate,’ on the significance 
of internal and external determinants of behavior. The debate stems from the `pure trait’ 
model and the idea that people display consistencies in behavior (expressing the trait in 
question) over time and situations (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). Rather than an either/or 
proposition, advocates of interactionism would propose that behavior is a matter of 
characteristics of the person interacting with situational factors. 
Beginning in the 1960s empirical research demonstrated that both person variables and 
situation variables, together, affected behavior. Statistical analysis demonstrated that the 
interaction of the two accounted for more variance than either alone. Endler (1983), a main 
proponent of interactionism, distinguished between mechanistic interaction, based on 
person-environment independence, and another (unlabeled) type in which person could not 
be realistically separated from situation. In behavior, the person and situation are interwoven 
in a continuous process (Endler and Magnusson, 1976). This second type was deemed 
empirically unfeasible since it would require study of the interaction process over time. 
Nonetheless, as Endler expressed it, “We are dealing with static snapshots rather than 
movies” (1983, p. 192). By the 2000s, the importance of personality-situation interaction 
was recognized (Corr & Mathews, 2009) and a broad consensus had formed (Blum et al., 
2018). The separation of person from situation, however, remains. 
Roberts (2007) concluded that most researchers accept that models of human nature require 
an interactional foundation. The question remained, however, as to which situations are the 
most important to the functioning of personality. At different periods attempts have been 
made to determine taxonomies of situations but they were so different that their integration 
was improbable. Some emphasized subjective aspects while others emphasized objective 
characteristics. Woodworth (1937, in Pervin, 1985) for example, maintained that personality 
consistency rested on the perceived similarity of situations in relation to what the individual 
was trying to achieve. Moos (1973), on the other hand, emphasized ecological dimensions, 
organizational structure, and behavior settings. What is defined as environment varies 
depending on whether it is the actual environment or the perceived environment (Pervin, 
1978a). If, as Mischel and Shoda (1995) argued, the definition of a situation is with respect 
to features deemed significant by the researcher, but irrelevant to those being studied, it 
should not be expected that behavior will vary meaningfully over situations. McAdams 
(1996) suggested a need to study the person’s life ecology, the environments and settings 
that are salient. Despite objective similarities, personal life history may render an 
assumption of equivalence of situations over persons a falsehood. 
While the foregoing merely sketches the historical development of personality psychology, 
it does indicate some central issues that are sufficient for present purposes. During the early 
formative period, John Dewey was developing his psychological perspective that would 
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challenge some of the fundamental assumptions of personality psychology. That is the next 
consideration. 
John Dewey’s Anticipatory Critique of Personality 
Psychology 
As was stated, Dewey’s major works were written before personality psychology had 
achieved the status of a subdiscipline, but his general psychology had considerable bearing 
on the issues taken up within the field. Beginning with his organicist views, a consideration 
of some of his relevant propositions will be considered next. To set the stage, his general 
standpoint was well expressed in his twenty-fifth anniversary address to the American 
Psychological Association (Dewey, 1917). Therein he proposed that when elementary 
biological functions were removed, what remained of mental life fell within the scope of 
social psychology. He cautioned that such an abstraction did not exist, that human 
psychology in the concrete was bio-social. In his eighties, Dewey (1939) concluded that the 
psychology he had been developing was a socio-biological or biological-cultural 
psychology. From birth, the biological human organism was engaged with the physical and 
sociocultural environment, its milieu, and through adapting to it, and interweaving with it, 
there emerges the qualities of mind and individuality. In this, his general theory of 
psychology, there are aspects that bear upon issues in personality psychology. These will 
be discussed thematically in terms of organicism and the person-situation debate, 
coordinated activity in the environment, developing connections with the sociocultural 
environment, the development of personality and individuality, and whether human 
engagement with the world is best accounted for in terms of evolutionary adaptations or 
adjustments to the current environment. Lastly, Dewey’s concerns with the adequacy of 
psychological research will considered as they apply to personality psychology. 
Organicism and the Person-Situation Debate 
To Dewey (1884) human life provides psychology with its material but psychology owed a 
debt to biology for its introduction of the concepts of `organism’ and `organic.’ As Haldane 
(1884) expressed it, when considering the organism as composed of numerous, separate 
parts, the parts must be viewed as being in reciprocal relations to each other within a whole, 
a system in which all parts constantly act upon each other. The idea of reciprocity, 
furthermore, was extended by Dewey to the relation between organism and environment. 
Accepting the necessity of the environment to the organism, Dewey (1884) incorporated 
psychical life into his organicism: “The idea of environment is a necessity to the idea of 
organism, and with the conception of environment comes the impossibility of considering 
psychical life as an individual, isolated thing developing in a vacuum” (p. 285). The 
individual, beyond the physical environment, is in an organic relation with organized social 
life from which mental nourishment is drawn, and within which the person must function. 
Each person is wed to societal life, and through it there are close connections with the social 
past through heredity, tradition, and education. At this point in his career Dewey was 
entrenched in Hegelian, absolute idealism, and the proposition that an absolute mind is 
objectified in cultural institutions, and that these shape the individual mind (Dewey, Ja., 
1939). Regardless, there was little evidence of idealism in the 1884 article but there were 
clear traces of the naturalism that was to follow (Flower and Murphey, 1977). As Dewey 
(1930a) wrote in autobiographical statement, his study of physiology as an undergraduate 
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left the impression of the human organism as a unity and spurred a desire to establish the 
same interrelatedness and interdependence of life and world. 
Given the emphasis on interrelatedness, Dewey (1938) had a somewhat different 
perspective on the person-situation debate. Although commonsense distinguishes between 
organism and environment, that differentiation can lead to an assumption of their 
independence and, subsequently, to the introduction of a third thing—their interaction (as 
the interactionists in personality psychology clearly did), when, in fact, they are integrated. 
There are not organisms and environments but organisms-in-environments, As Dewey & 
Bentley (1949) expressed it: 
 
Organisms do not live without air and water, nor without food ingestion and radiation. They live, 
that is, as much in processes across and “through” skins as in processes “within” skins. One might 
as well study an organism in complete detachment from its environment as try to study an electric 
clock on the wall in disregard of the wire leading to it (Dewey and Bentley, 1949, p. 128). 
 
Medium and environment are more than what surrounds and encompasses an individual 
(Dewey, 1916/1961). They refer to a continuity of surroundings with the individual’s 
characteristic, active tendencies, and consist of the conditions that support or hinder those 
activities. This is reflected in what he earlier wrote on individuality. There are two sides to 
individuality: on one side are the person’s special dispositions, talents, and temperament, 
and, on the other, the surroundings, the situation, and the opportunities afforded (Dewey, 
1891/1969). Each of these in isolation was an unreal abstraction. Rather than being 
constituted by the two together, they are two ways of looking at individuality—from within 
and without. No capacity or disposition will manifest without exterior circumstances. The 
environment and circumstances of the individual, along with constituent makeup, are 
involved in individuality: 
 
The difference between one individual and another lies as much in the station in which each is 
placed as in the capacity of each. That is to say, environment enters into individuality as a 
constituent factor, helping make it what it is (Dewey, 1891/1969, p. 302). 
 
In separating organism or person from environment, as much as with detaching individual 
traits from whole persons, one has instances of what Dewey referred to as the ‘tradition of 
separation and isolation’ and the `analytic fallacy.’ 
With the `tradition of separation and isolation’ qualitative differences are identified and, 
then, that conceptual distinction is left to stand on its own, apart from the context in which 
it was embedded (Dewey, 1928)—such as persons from environments, traits from persons, 
or minds from bodies. This creates an artificial isolation of the discriminated characteristics 
from each other. Positively, such abstractions from immediate conditions of existence, form 
ideas and become concepts, give order to such interrelations, and support effective 
engagement. In abstraction something is freed from one experience in order to transfer it, 
or generalize it, to another (Dewey, 1920). In that there is no problem (Dewey, 1928). 
Negatively, there is an issue when such abstractions become reified, given an ontological 
existence, rather than an intellectual, conceptual status, and treated as though a concrete 
actuality. 
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The problem of the `analytic fallacy’ is not with the analysis but in the ignoring of the 
context within which the analysis took place, and for which analysis was undertaken 
(Dewey, 1931/1998). It is present when elements or distinctions have been discriminated 
and then treated as self-sufficient. It results in atomizing and a desiccation of the world lived 
in, as well as of ourselves. The logical conclusion is the denial of continuity and all 
connection. This was what occurred with the concept of the ̀ reflex arc’ whose elementalism 
Dewey overcame with the principles of coordination and activity 
Coordination and Activity 
Dewey (1896) contended that the reflex arc, as a unit of analysis, resulted in a disjointed 
psychology, a series of disconnected reflexive reactions, that broke the continuity and unity 
of ongoing streams of behavior, of smoothly flowing acts. Rather than the reflex, Dewey 
preferred the act as a unit of analysis for psychological activity. The act captures the ongoing 
interplay of organism and environment and includes feeling, thought, and purpose as 
integrated, inseparable aspects (English & English, 1958). Psychological discourse, to 
Dewey (1948), has mistakenly torn apart the practical, intellectual, and emotional, turning 
them into entities and creating, thereby, the artificial problem of restoring their working 
together. Pervin (1978b), among later personality psychologists, recognized the challenge 
of treating feelings, thoughts and behaviors as separate entities, especially given how 
organized functioning actually is.  
The act represents what Endler (1983) referred to as the interaction process wherein person 
was inseparable from situation in a process extending over time. The reflex arc concept, like 
the separation of person from environment, failed when studied in the context of concrete 
behavior. The breaks that existed were in the psychologist’s interpretive processes and left 
out something crucial—the supposed reflex is both preceded and followed by ongoing 
behavior. Active living, as an ongoing process, involves transitions through transforming 
circumstances which are missing from momentary research considerations wherein 
situations are represented as independent variables. 
Central to Dewey’s (1896) reflex arc critique was the concept of `coordination’ in which 
parts of an organism work harmoniously together and, through successfully adapting to life 
conditions, the person and the environment are harmonized. Coordination is an act of 
organic connection of the psychophysical organism with the environment, including the 
sociocultural milieu. When coordinations require no further adjustments, and are regularly 
called upon, they become habits. Coordination, indivisibly connecting organism and 
environment, is relatively fixed in habit but malleable in adjustment. Dewey (1899/1976) 
expanded on the principle of coordination, as that is applied to mind and personality, in his 
paper on child development. 
Developing Coordinations and Personality 
In biological growth the main function is the construction of coordinations (internally and 
externally) that support the infant in adjusting to the environment (Dewey, 1899/1976). 
From birth, separate motor and sensory systems are associated and combined into more 
complex coordinations (like cephalocaudal development and eye-hand coordination), 
becoming operative organically. The crystallization of these adjustments into habits 
facilitates effective, rapid action, and survival. These are further elaborated as adequate 
activity levels are achieved and serve larger ends. Gradually, instinctive aspects are 
decreasing in importance and the child is developing skills needed to enter the social world 
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of the community and societal/cultural conditions. Those conditions increase in their degree 
of influence and draw the individual into expanding activities in the social medium, through 
the development of more wide-ranging habits. The habits formed are not immutable and 
permanent (Dewey, 1922). Old habits may cease to be functional as life proceeds and the 
need for further adjustments, serviceable under new conditions, arise. Allport (1937) 
considered Dewey’s conception, which he referred to as generalized habit, to be equivalent 
to his own conception of traits (although Allport’s conception was internal and Dewey’s 
was transactional). It would also be comparable to McCrae and Costa’s (2003) characteristic 
adaptations (products of the Five Factors of personality interacting with the external 
environment) but, in both approaches, the person-environment inseparability is missing. 
According to Dewey (1911), just as the body needs food and air, a cultural medium is 
required for mind and character (roughly equivalent to personality) to develop. Humans 
enter life with primitive impulses that are undirected and loose, and the cultural environment 
provides the design by which each new entrant is transformed (Dewey, 1922). The loose 
impulses are remade into serviceable habits, the patterns that individual conduct is fashioned 
into. Physical conditions are molded in cultural environments, interwoven with traditions, 
customs, interests, purposes, and occupations, and envelop the individual (Dewey, 1938). 
The social medium produces systems of behavior and dispositions to action (Dewey, 
1916/1961). Mind (and personality) was not innate; it is an acquisition formed by original 
activities being shaped by social forces, by the child taking part in joint activities and 
language (Dewey, 1917). The quality of mind formed depends on the quality of the society 
and social relations born into. Mind is a product and only after being produced does it 
become a cause. Operation of native tendencies in non-social environments leads to 
negligible development, a relative vacancy of mind. Individuality, subjectivity, selfhood, 
and personality are functions that emerge in complexly organized social interactions 
(Dewey, 1925/1958). 
The Individual’s Environment and Individuality 
To Dewey, each newborn, biological infant is connected to the environment, as with 
respiration and reflexes, but is, from the start, subject to a social/cultural world to which 
connections are established, and from which meanings are appropriated; these orient the 
child to the world-as-lived-in (Dewey, 1916/1961). Through active engagement with the 
world, the individual establishes a personal relationship to aspects of what is potentially 
available. A distinction needs to be made, therefore, between a global environment, and 
those specific aspects of the environment with which an organism establishes relations 
(Dewey, 1938)—a personal environment. What is referred to as `environment’ involves 
physical conditions which are enmeshed in conditions that are cultural (Dewey & Bentley, 
1949). The environment is not something external to, and around, activities. It is the 
medium, the milieu for those activities, the channel for their movement and continuation, 
with which the individual is coordinated. 
In analyzing conduct, it is important to consider not just the agent but the situation within 
which activity is occurring (Dewey, 1894/1897). Conduct may issue from an agent but it is 
done in reference to the conditions that are present. Environmental conditions, including the 
social, constitute action because (1) education shapes the habits of feeling, thinking, and 
acting. (2) Acts are subject to control by the demands of others (family, friends, authorities), 
surrounding stimuli (books, tools, objects), and the range of opportunities afforded. (3) 
Without environmental forces no idea or plan could transition into action. The definition of 
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conduct has to include the scene of the performed action unless that definition is restricted 
to wholly internal states. Internal states, at the same time are not to be excluded since what 
a situation is to a person depends on personal capacities (skills, resources, knowledge). 
Besides the differences between cultures adapted to, within cultures there exist subcultures 
(classes, occupations, clubs, gangs) that have their own specialized modes of social 
organization, and these have formative influences on the active dispositions of individuals 
(Dewey, 1916/1961). The conduct of individuals is given shape through inculcation into the 
habits of thought, feeling, and action of their group (Dewey, 1894/1897). It is in these 
transactions that the distinctive, stable patterns of the individual have their origin. 
Traditionally, it was such characteristic patterns of thought, emotion, and behavior that 
personality theories were intended to be accounts of (Funder, 2013). 
On Personality as an Evolved Adaptation 
The popular Five Factor Theory of personality identifies five dispositions or personality 
traits that are biologically rooted tendencies (Costa, et al., 2019). These basic tendencies, 
which are the supposed universal structure of personality, are purported to have a causal 
influence on behavior and are unaffected by experience or the environment; but they do 
interact with the physical and social environment to produce characteristic adaptations 
(McCrae and Costa, 2003). As biologically based, Costa and McCrae speculate that these 
dispositions may have conferred an adaptive advantage on humans. To MacDonald (1995), 
they are subsystems that evolved to solve adaptive problems which, to Buss (1991), are 
related to survival and reproduction and arose, through natural selection, as adaptations to 
problems confronting our hominid ancestors. Differences in personality are strategies 
directed toward solving recurrent adaptive problems (Buss 2009). For Dewey, should these 
biological bases exist, they would be impulses, and subject to adjusting to current conditions 
and problems that are beyond those from our evolutionary past.  
Cultures, to Dewey (1939/1989), stimulate native tendencies and support a range of 
variation over the course of development. Such variation is a factor in human individuality. 
In this, Dewey rejects the supposed fixity of human nature. Certain needs may be constant 
but the consequences they lead to are subject to modification and being shaped into new 
forms, given prevailing cultural forms (laws, morals, science, industry, religion). Humans 
have few pure instincts; instead there are loosely organized impulses that are subject to a 
broad range of possibilities (Dewey, 1894/1971). Dewey (1898) therefore rejected 
arguments that account for human conduct in terms of fitness or adaptations to conditions 
from the evolutionary past. The term `fit’ had to refer to social structures and demands, the 
ideals and group habits, that assured effective conduct under present circumstances. 
The current environment is continuously changing, so fitness requires flexibility in adjusting 
to unanticipated change. Biological impulses, inherited from distant ancestors, must be 
modified, restrained, suppressed, or replaced, to be effective under current conditions. 
Through education, there is an alternative form of natural selection upon individual action. 
The social process of education (which is more than formal schooling—Dewey, 
1916/1961)) forms habits and interests that equip the child to assume adult occupations 
(Dewey, 1900). From birth, the child is subject to the attention and demands of others, 
guiding, instructing, and socializing the child, promoting the acquisition of limitations and 
habits (Dewey, 1922). As Dewey (1946/1975) expressed it, “all institutions are educational 
in the sense that they operate to form the attitudes, dispositions, abilities, and disabilities 
that constitute a concrete personality” (p. 62). 
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More recently, in line with Dewey, Cantor (1990) argued that evolutionary accounts refer 
to ancestral origins and ancestral environment, but it is contemporary life problems and 
complexities that confront people. Human behaviors and the brain systems that underlie 
them, to Panksepp and Panksepp (2000), are considerably more plastic than is emphasized 
by evolutionary psychologists; adaptive behavior is guided by genes, experience and 
culture. The path of human evolution, Rose (2000) contends, has led to organisms that are 
eminently plastic, having brains/minds and ways of living that are adaptable, and that, 
besides genes, we inherit cultures and technologies which shape individuals profoundly. 
Despite our common biological heritage, as Dewey contended, we are presented with a 
range of possibilities that lead to individual adjustments and activities. 
On Psychological Research 
According to Dewey (1900) there are clear benefits to be gained through the psychological 
laboratory, but they are accompanied by deficits. Complete control over conditions, and 
accuracy in determining influences, requires an isolation and exclusion of the usual 
conditions of thought and action. The result is findings that are remote and artificial. Unless 
laboratory results are to yield abstractions only, the results should be interpreted by 
gradually re-approximating real-life conditions. To ignore context is equivalent to its denial 
(Dewey, 1931/1998). In more recent psychology, this has been termed `context stripping,’ 
referring to the reduction (or elimination) of complexity and individuality by ignoring lives 
in their natural milieu (Worell & Etaugh, 1994). Arnett (2008) connected this to early 
psychologist’s attempts to emulate the natural sciences and the effort to identify universals 
in human behavior. 
The context of the experimental situation, to Dewey (1931/1998), includes more than the 
final, abstracted elements. There is the background of the experimenter, which includes the 
state of theory that set the problem under investigation, and the purpose of the design and 
measures used. For instance, Endler (1983) expressed the need, theoretically, to study the 
person-environment, interaction process, where person and environment were inseparable, 
but reverted to interacting, discrete variables because a method was lacking. This reflects 
mainstream psychology’s emphasis on what Holzkamp (1984/1991) referred to as `variable 
psychology,’ the experimental-statistical method.  A method that is based on the `act,’ 
Dewey’s suggested unit of analysis, might have addressed the integrated, person-
environment process. Besides the experimenter aspect of the experimental context, there 
was the subject’s current disposition and habits. In personality research we know little of 
our participants, beyond information like age, ethnicity, gender, or education level, the focus 
being on the preferred construct. We know so little of the people being experimented upon 
that it prompted Carlson (1971) to ask where the person in personality research is. 
To Dewey, the distinctions identified in the laboratory are isolated from contexts (such as 
personal history and conditions of individual living) and lead to generalizations that are 
based on compounds of independent units. For instance, the Five Factor Theory traits are 
considered completely independent of each other which, obviously, is inconsistent with 
personality as an organized whole. Generalizing such independent units into a broad theory, 
Dewey maintained, arises logically from the suppression of context and, because of that 
suppression, the elements are rendered absolute since there are no limiting conditions. The 
results, which are valid under specifiable conditions, are transformed into a broad 
metaphysical doctrine. Allport (1939), reflecting on Dewey, concluded that Deweyites are 
unimpressed by segments of behavior that are excised in the laboratory since they know that 
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true statements cannot be conferred upon fragments that have been removed from natural 
contexts. “They,” he wrote, “have little use for a psychology that isolates separate functions 
within the total course of experience, and prefer a thoroughgoing organismic psychology, 
preferably one that has a strong social emphasis” (p. 289). 
Fallacy of Neglecting Development 
Related to the idea of ignoring context is the `fallacy of neglecting development’ which is 
another aspect of individual context. Dewey (1928) discussed this with respect to the 
isolation of an organic process or structure for investigation, as with the use of the reflex 
arc as the unit of analysis. Such an analysis is cross-sectional, looking at a moment frozen 
in time for purposes of analysis, rather than longitudinal, and supports mechanistic 
explanations, bereft of qualities of intellect and emotionality. Looked at longitudinally, 
human action incorporates a history and an outlook on the future, including understandings, 
purposes and attitudes. The fallacy of neglecting development is the ignoring of individual 
history and its directive effect on ongoing conduct. To know a person, Dewey’s protege 
Percy Hughes (1928) wrote, one must establish the person’s `life-history,’ learning of the 
past and current engagement in life activities to establish a sense of the person’s `life-
movement’ which only manifests in wholeness. Context-stripping ignores `life-movement.’ 
This has bearing upon psychological research with respect to the situations or stimuli that 
are incorporated into experimental research. Mischel and Shoda (1995) proposed that if the 
definition of the situation is with respect to features that are significant to the researcher, 
but irrelevant to the persons studied, one should not expect behavior to vary meaningfully 
over situations. One should first identify those situational features that are meaningful to the 
individuals. Situational analysis, to Wagerman and Funder (2009), must begin by 
identifying attributes that are relevant to people psychologically. Furthermore, there is a 
problem of perspective since personal perceptions of a situation can differ (which pertains 
to an individual’s developmental history).  
Outside of the abstract conditions of research, it must be asked what, in the concrete, 
constitutes a stimulus? Life, to Dewey (1916/1961), is matter of acting, rather than passive 
existence, and the environmental medium enters activity as a condition that sustains or 
frustrates it. When the process of activity is fully coordinated, habits operate without a need 
for consciousness; situations sustain continued, progressive movement. Frustrating 
conditions, on the other hand, are those in which forward movement is impeded and call 
forth a need to constitute the conditions, to determine what needs doing and, in this, the 
stimulus and the response are constituted simultaneously (Dewey, 1896). What renders 
something a stimulus is the whole organism’s condition, the needs and type of behavior 
currently engaged in, and that is historical and longitudinal (Dewey, 1928). In concrete life, 
the situations encountered enter into ongoing conduct under the direction of current 
purposes and activities, and stimulating conditions arise from disruptions in the coordinated 
activity. 
Abstraction versus Approximating Context 
To concretize what has been presented let us consider the paper that introduced 
Interactionism in personality. Endler et al. (1962) examined the trait of Anxiousness as it 
interacted with different situations. The situations examined were commencing a long road 
trip, meeting a new date, entering a psychological experiment, crawling along a mountain 
ledge, rising to deliver a speech, entering counselling for a personal problem, setting off to 
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sail rough waters, entering a public contest, being alone in nighttime woods, entering an 
important job interview, and going into an important final exam. The participants were 232 
male and female introductory psychology students. They were selected for being high or 
low on a test of anxiety. To each situation they were asked to rate their estimated intensity 
in 14 physiological reactions associated with anxiety. 
The first obvious point is that these people are without a personal identity and represent the 
fallacy of neglected development. With the limited information available only two situations 
can be expected to be relevant: entry into a psychology experiment (which they were in) 
and taking an examination (being students). Outside of that their personal history has great 
relevance. Were they accustomed to any of the situations? As Mischel and Shoda (1995) 
noted, these situations, if not relevant to participants, may yield meaningless results. I used 
to live in the Rocky Mountains and have been on ledges so that is not anxiety provoking to 
me. Also, I have camped alone in the forest, so I have established habits and coordinations 
that make anxiousness over pondering that inconsequential. For the remainder, I would have 
to speculate. A person’s life-history, their life-activities, matter. What is of interest to the 
experimenters, however, is the abstraction under investigation, not whole persons in 
context. Forgetting the function of the detached fragment is, to Dewey (1920), false 
abstractionism. The aim of the investigation was to establish the statistical, person-
environment interaction, not what conditions in the participant’s personal lives provoke 
anxiousness, or not. The intent was to establish some lawful generality. In the opinion of 
Dewey (1910), actual life conditions involve a multiplicity of details but establishing 
scientific laws leads to a universality that is remote from such conditions and, hence, 
abstract. In contrast, the ends to which actual conduct is directed, are specific and concrete.  
To move beyond abstractions, laboratory results must be reinterpreted by re-approximating 
real-life conditions or context (Dewey, 1931/1998). It is a matter of establishing what can 
be called ̀ concrete validity.’ McClelland (1951), acknowledging that the goal of personality 
psychology is an adequate understanding of individual persons, pointed out that while 
general laws are needed their validity is tested through being applied to individual cases. 
Allport (1962) proposed that, after searching for generalizations, we should return to 
individuals for a more accurate assessment. As he put it, “we stop with our wobbly laws of 
personality and seldom confront them with the concrete person” (p. 407). Further, he asked, 
should measuring instrument validation be limited to objective validation, or should 
subjective validation be sought by asking participants what they think of the diagnosis 
made? This, the richest source of data, is seldom consulted. In other words, we are left with 
a psychology of abstractions which are not connected to concrete lives. As Dewey 
(1931/1998) wrote, analysis can falsify when results are portrayed as complete unto 
themselves, separate from context. The counterpart to the `analytic fallacy’ is the `fallacy 
of unlimited universalization’ (Dewey, 1931/1998). If context is considered, every 
generalization is recognized as occurring under `limiting conditions’ that situations set. 
When that fact is ignored a principle that holds under specifiable conditions can be extended 
without limits. 
Coincident Postulates in Kritische Psychologie 
While Dewey’s theorizing was not organized into a theory of personality, it applies, 
nonetheless, to mainstream personality psychology. Outside of that institution, in the 
tradition of Kritische Psychologie (Holzkampian Critical Psychology), there have been 
developments in personality theorizing that, while independent of Dewey, resonate with 
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some of his criticisms. Dewey, as was noted, was critical of the abstract nature of 
decontextualized, experimental procedures and argued that it was necessary that real life 
conditions be better approximated. This was echoed by critical psychologists. To Dreier 
(2007, 2009), mainstream psychology has advanced the proposition that psychological 
phenomena should be studied scientifically, arranged experimentally, with limited features 
abstracted from life conditions serving as variables. Such procedures isolate both 
experimenters and participants from their current social participations. The knowledge 
produced is about links between variables and is largely ill-informed about how personal 
functioning coheres with the world-as-lived-in. Psychological functioning and its structure 
are rendered free-floating, detached from the social practice structures of the life milieu. In 
contrast, critical psychologists emphasize surpassing this `psychology without a world’ by 
focusing on the `conduct of everyday life’ as the proper subject matter for psychological 
investigation (Holzkamp, 1996/2013). They argue that to understand persons we need to 
examine them in the world that they participate in, rather than being concerned with abstract 
personality structures that are internal to the person (Dreier, 1999a). Instead, they favor 
`practice research’ which involves empirical studies conducted with persons while involved 
in concrete social practices (Dreier, 2020).  
Most personality theories, in the estimation of Dreier (1999a), are based on a fixed internal 
structure (needs, traits, goals), and an emphasis on coherence or integration. In this, there is 
failure to do justice to the diversity and complexities of social practices which foster lives 
that are multidimensional. Prevailing notions of unitary subjects is too simplistic to account 
for the conduct of life in complex societies (Dreier, 1996). For that reason, Dreier (2011) 
preferred the term `person’ over `personality to represent an agentic, holistic approach to 
persons-as-situated, embedded in social practices and locations. That means that 
`participation’ should be an important concept, in psychological theory, concerning how 
persons are continually engaged in social practices (Dreier, 1999b). This, as did Dewey’s 
person-environment mutualism, unites personhood with the world, instead of succumbing 
to an analytic distinction that renders personality separate and internal. Accordingly, the 
foundation of personality is located in everyday life, in the structures of personal 
participation in structured social practice; it is contextualized (Dreier, 1999a). As Dewey 
noted, through entry into the societal/cultural medium, individuals are interwoven with the 
enveloping traditions, interests, occupations, and purposes of the groups with which they 
participate. In this they establish a personal milieu from the more global socio-cultural 
environment. 
Dreier (2009) expands upon what was germinal in Dewey by introducing the distinction 
between location, position, and stance, and the recognition that their configuration is 
variable over diverse contexts. The lifeworld is not homogeneous; individuals, in everyday 
life, do not inhabit a single context. They are occupied with home, work, fellowships, 
comradeships, and so on. To fully participate in any presupposes knowledge of the 
organization regarding procedural arrangements, social positions, task and authority 
distribution, and the concerns of other participants. One’s position of influence and action 
possibilities, and the types of practices exercised, will vary in accordance with their place 
in the particular `social structure of practice’ (Dreier, 2016). Across contexts, persons are 
guided by stances, by personal concerns, which reorient and redirect activities in current 
contexts (Dreier, 1999a). Stances help guide people to be flexible in acting without 
becoming chameleons; to be situated is not to be situation bound. Persons must decide what 
they stand for, what is important, what they would support, oppose, or change (Dreier, 
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2016). Transitioning from one context to another, participation modes, positions and 
relationships vary, and the range of possible activities fluctuate, as do the personal concerns 
relative to each. Just as Dewey warned against overgeneralizing experimental results, given 
the limiting conditions set by existing conditions, Dreier (2011) cautioned against 
overgeneralizing assessments based on conduct in a single social context. In reflecting the 
diversity of their life-contexts, persons are multifaceted, and that evades detection in 
isolated instances. 
As a final point of concurrence, personhood has an historical dimension at both the 
individual and the societal levels. As Dewey wrote, individual life-history has a directive 
effect on ongoing conduct and must be known to get a sense of a person’s life-movement. 
Collectively, evolutionary `fit’-ness was not a question of adaptations to an evolutionary 
past but flexibility in dealing with current societal structures and the demands imposed by 
socio-cultural change. The life-trajectories of individual persons, Dreier (2009) wrote, have 
an historical dimension in that, over the course of life, there are changes in the composition 
of the social context (childhood, school, peers, work, family), and practices therein. And 
these influence the conduct of everyday life and, hence, personhood. Beyond that, social 
practices themselves undergo historical development, and the changes effected imply 
transformations in personal practice, and in the abilities required for full participation in 
altered social practices. Dewey witnessed this firsthand. 
In Dewey’s lifetime there were enormous changes in American society that  were reflected 
in the changing character of the people (Dewey and Dewey, 1915/2008). During the pioneer 
period, people lived largely in isolation and had to be self-sustaining and self-sufficient, 
providing for all their needs. The world did not present itself to them ready-made. Their 
occupations required the psychological qualities of adaptability, inventiveness, and 
courageousness. That period ended with the passage into industrialism and commercialism 
(Dewey, 1930a). Companies provided for one’s needs and people were moving into the 
cities and mechanized factory work. With this came a change in mental attitude (Dewey, 
1930b). Rather than minds being stimulated by demands for creativity and independence, 
there was an emphasis on receptivity to the discoveries and ideas of others. People became 
consumers, not just of products but ideas. Independent, critical judgement became lacking 
as people became more submissive, passively receptive to political and commercial methods 
of persuasion. Individualism and independence was giving way to conformity and 
interdependence. In less than a century the psychological makeup of the people had been 
restructured by the new societal structures and practices. 
Approaching Personality Organization and Consistency 
We close by returning to the beginning and the question of the whole person. Personality 
psychology was established to study persons as unique, coherent wholes (Mischel et al., 
2008). As McAdams (2009) expressed it, only personality psychology professes to be 
studying persons as complex wholes, putting all the parts together. This to Funder (2013) is 
an impossible mission: “If you try to understand everything about a person at once, you will 
immediately find yourself overwhelmed” (p. 5). The solution is to limit what you look at, 
an approach that produces different paradigms. Consistent with that, there has been a 
proliferation of constructs to address the question of personality: trait theory, physiological 
approaches, cultural psychology, situationism, self theory, cognitive approaches, and others. 
This diversity leads to variable definitions of personality. There is no single agreed upon 
definition and the differences that exist reflect different theoretical beliefs (Cervone & 
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Pervin, 2013). That means there is disunity. The field still fails to meet its historical mission 
of developing an integrative framework for comprehending whole persons (McAdam & 
Pals, 2006). To that end, McAdams and Pals proposed `five big principles’ to draw together 
various approaches into an `elegant theoretical framework.’ Essentially, they, and others, 
have attempted to overcome the disjointedness by developing different versions of eclectic 
coherence. Regardless, as Cervone and Mischel (2002) maintained, the challenge is to come 
to grips with the psychological architecture of persons as intact wholes.  
A corollary of the effort to account for personality organization and integration was the need 
to account for individual differences between people in their stable patterns of thought, 
emotion, and behavior. It was really this that experimentalists concerned themselves with. 
Some sought evidence of the cross-situational stability of some characteristic, others 
favored situational specificity, and, more recently, the interaction of person and situation. 
At the root of their debate was what Dewey referred to as the `tradition of separation and 
isolation’ which distinguished between person and situation, hypostatized them, and made 
them discontinuous. With this absolute separation the issue of their relation became 
problematic. Instead, as both Dewey and Dreier emphasized, persons are not detached from 
their environments. Rather than seeking the foundation of personality or personhood 
internally, it is to be sought in person-environment mutualism (Dewey) or in persons-as-
situated in social practices of everyday life (Dreier). Perhaps what is needed is the attitude 
that Dashiell (1939) ascribed to clinicians –that their interest was in persons as situated in 
the natural and social environment, and possessing a past, present, and future. If there is a 
historical aspect to personhood, personality development should not be bypassed. In this, 
we may address the proposition of Allport (1937) that “a general law may be a law that tells 
us how uniqueness comes about” (p. 194, original emphasis). Before being subjected to the 
ahistorical, decontextualized, dissecting process of experimental psychology, persons are 
organized wholes, and in coordination with their everyday world, which is essential to their 
survival. Stability of personality rests with stability of contextualized practice. If the overall 
configuration of a context changes significantly (from the individual person’s perspective) 
one can expect a change in the qualities characterizing individual conduct. For instance, a 
person may be pleasant and gregarious at work, but might become bitter and withdrawn 
after being bypassed for a promotion because of nepotism. That could carry over into the 
context of home life but may not affect engagements with friends. In the final analysis, 
persons live in, through, and across contexts and that is where personality manifests. 
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